



Date: 05/06/2026  
Our ref: 01/FOI/26/016850/Z

**FREEDOM OF INFORMATION REQUEST REFERENCE NO: 01/FOI/26/016850/Z**

I write in connection with your request for information dated 08/05/2026, received by Greater Manchester Police (GMP) for the following information:

- 1. What is the total amount spent by the force on Covert Human Intelligence Sources (CHIS) over the last five financial years? (Please break this down for each year from 2021/2022 up until 2025/2026)*
- 2. For each of those periods, please could you list the number of individuals who have received a payment that is categorised as one made to a CHIS?*

**Result of Searches**

Greater Manchester Police can neither confirm nor deny that it holds any information as the duty in Section 1(1)(a) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 does not apply by virtue of the following exemptions:

- **Section 23(5) – Information Supplied by, or concerning, certain Security Bodies**
- **Section 24(2) – National Security**
- **Section 30(3) – Investigations and Proceedings Conducted by Public Authorities**
- **Section 40(5) – Personal Information**

Sections 23 and 40 are absolute exemptions and as such no public interest test is required. Sections 24, 30 are class-based, qualified exemptions and there is a requirement to consider the public interest to ensure neither confirming nor denying information is held is appropriate, which can be seen below.

## **Harm for confirming nor denying that any other information is held for Sections 24 and 30**

Any release under the Freedom of Information Act is a disclosure to the world, not just to the individual making the request. To confirm or deny whether information is held pertinent to this request would reveal whether Greater Manchester Police has received variations of intelligence from Covert Human Intelligence Sources from different timeline.

Police forces work in conjunction with other agencies and information is freely shared in line with information sharing protocols. Modern-day policing is intelligence led, and this is particularly pertinent regarding both law enforcement and national security. The public expect police forces to use all powers and tactics available to them to prevent and detect crime or disorder and maintain public safety. The prevention and detection of crime is the foundation upon which policing is built and the threat from terrorism cannot be ignored. It is generally recognised that the international security landscape is increasingly complex and unpredictable.

The current UK threat level from international terrorism, based on intelligence, is assessed as substantial which means that a terrorist attack is likely. To counter criminal and terrorist behaviour, it is vital that the police can work together, where necessary covertly, to obtain intelligence within current legislative frameworks to assist in the investigative process to ensure the successful arrest and prosecution of offenders who commit or plan to commit acts of terrorism. To achieve this goal, it is vitally important that information sharing takes place between police officers, members of the public, police forces as well as other law enforcement bodies within the United Kingdom. Such action would support counter terrorism measures in the fight to deprive terrorist networks of their ability to commit crime. In addition, to confirm or deny whether information is held in this case has the potential to undermine the flow of information (intelligence) received from CHIS as well as members of the public into the Police Service relating to these types of offenders thereby undermining National Security and leaving the United Kingdom at risk of more terrorist attacks.

### **Public Interest Test**

#### **Factors favouring confirming or denying that any other information is held for Section 24**

Confirmation or denial that any other information exists relevant to the request would lead to a better-informed public and the public are entitled to know the how public funds are spent by the police. The information simply relates to national security and disclosure would not actually harm it.

#### **Factors against confirming or denying that any other information is held for Section 24**

Other organisations outside the police service are also widely engaged in utilising and rewarding informants in several ways, and therefore by confirming or denying that any information exists relevant to the request would harm the close relationship that exists with such organisations, where trust and confidence in this specific area has been built up in the exchange of information and financial assistance during the Criminal Justice process. To confirm or deny whether Greater Manchester Police hold any information would allow inferences to be made about CHIS used and the nature and extent of national security related activities which may or may not take place in a given area. This could enable terrorist groups to take steps to avoid detection, and as such, confirmation or denial would be damaging to

national security. By confirming or denying any policing arrangements of this nature have occurred would render national security measures less effective. This would lead to the compromise of ongoing or future operations to protect the security or infrastructure of the UK and increase the risk of harm to the public.

### **Section 30 Factors favouring disclosure:**

There is information within the public domain confirming that police use covert human intelligence sources to assist them with investigations and the effective delivery of law enforcement. Disclosure would enhance the public's knowledge about how information relating to informants is used by Greater Manchester Police and how the intelligence received assists in day-to-day investigations and operations to assist the prevention and detection of crime and the apprehension and prosecution of offenders. Disclosure would also assist in stopping any incorrect rumours or falsehoods relating to how the police store and manage how informants assist the police. It would also allow the public to determine whether the financial outlay by the force to informants is appropriate in comparison to the level of successful prosecutions.

### **Section 30 Factors favouring non-disclosure:**

Disclosure of the information requested could identify informant activity within a force area. Over a period, if several disclosures were made, individuals could analyse the information and identify any sudden peaks or troughs in informant activity. This would hinder the prevention and detection of crime and prejudice our ability to maintain confidential sources. Consequently, the force's future law enforcement capabilities would be affected. Similarly, the disclosure of the information would highlight when informants have been used which could place those persons, or those suspected of being an informant, in danger. The disclosure of this information would lead to informants losing confidence in Greater Manchester Police and would impede the recruitment of informants in the future.

### **Balancing Test:**

There is information within the public domain confirming that police use covert human intelligence sources to assist them with investigations and the effective delivery of law enforcement. The Police Service is tasked with protecting the community we serve and solving crime and there is a public interest argument in ensuring we are open and transparent regarding policing investigations and operations. There is no doubt that for the issues outlined above any disclosure relating to sensitive informant information would jeopardise those important roles. Informants play a vital role in assisting the police and is based very much on relationships built on trust and the expectation of complete confidentiality Greater Manchester Police would never disclose information which would compromise our policing tactics. It is therefore our opinion that the balance lies in favour of non-disclosure of the information.