Friday, 09 October 2026

Our ref: 01/FOI/26/017448/X

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION REQUEST REFERENCE NO: 01/FOI/26/017448/X

I write in connection with your request for information dated 13/08/2026, received by Greater Manchester Police (GMP) for the following information:

I have previously written to you asking for information relating to contracts this police force has had with Palantir Technologies/Palantir Technologies UK since 2009 and you have responded that you do not hold this information.

I am now writing for information specifically relating to whether you, as host force, have procured Palantir's services for your counter terrorism/intelligence/investigation/regional organised crime units.

Therefore, I am asking again, for contracts with Palantir Technologies or any of its subsidiaries since 2009:

1. Contracts and Commercial Arrangements

A list of all current and past contracts, agreements, pilot programs, or Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) between these specialist units and Palantir. For each, please provide:

i) The start and end dates.

ii) which specialist unit it related to (eg counter terrorism)

iii) The total monetary value of the contract/agreement.

iv) The specific software platforms or services provided (e.g., Palantir Gotham, Palantir Foundry etc).

iv) A summary of the scope of work outlining what Palantir was contracted to do.

2. Reviews and Evaluations

Please provide copies of any internal or independent reviews, audits, or evaluations assessing the performance, value for money, or operational effectiveness of Palantir's software or pilot programs. This includes, but is not limited to:

Outcome reports or post-implementation reviews of pilot programs (such as 'Project Nectar').

Any ethical reviews or minutes from ethics committees discussing the deployment of Palantir software or its underlying artificial intelligence capabilities.

Result of Searches

Please redirect your request related to the Regional Organised Crime Unit to Merseyside Police as they are a host and lead force for NWROCU.

As the host force for CTPNW, Greater Manchester Police can neither confirm nor deny that we hold any information relevant to your request by virtue of the following exemptions:

- **Section 24(2) – National Security**
- **Section 31(3) – Law Enforcement**

Harm – Sections 24(2) and 31(3)

GMP will neither confirm nor deny whether it holds any information on systems used in connection with CTPNW. The duty to confirm or deny is disapplied by virtue of sections 24(2) (national security) and 31(3) (law enforcement) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000. This response should not be taken as an indication of whether any information is held.

The Police Service is fundamentally charged with enforcing the law, preventing and detecting crime, and protecting the communities we serve. To do this effectively, CTPNW must maintain absolute operational security regarding their capabilities, infrastructure, and technical toolsets.

If GMP confirms or denies that specific technical systems are utilised by CTPNW, it provides critical operational intelligence to hostile actors or terrorists. This would directly compromise national security strategies and severely prejudice the tactical prevention and detection of high-level crime.

Public Interest Test

Factors in favour of confirming or denying Sections 24 and 31 - There is a strong public interest in openness and transparency about the systems used in CTPNW. Confirming or denying the existence of information could contribute to informed public debate about how

emerging technologies are deployed, the safeguards in place, and whether they align with legal and ethical standards.

Factors against confirming or denying Section 24 - There is an overriding public interest in protecting national security. Confirming or denying the existence of information about systems used by CTPNW would provide adversaries with useful insights into operational capabilities and priorities. Even a simple confirmation or denial could enable hostile actors to adjust methods, exploit potential gaps, or test thresholds. The resulting risk to national security would be real and more than trivial, and is not mitigated by partial or local confirmations, because the cumulative mosaic effect across multiple forces would still disclose sensitive capability at a national level.

Factors against confirming or denying Section 31 - Confirming or denying the existence of information relating to systems used by CTPNW would be likely to prejudice the prevention and detection of crime, the apprehension or prosecution of offenders, and the operation of law enforcement tactics and methodologies. Knowledge of whether specific capabilities exist, or do not exist, enables offenders to adapt behaviour, exploit capability gaps, frustrate investigations, and increase the cost and complexity of counter-measures. The public interest strongly favours maintaining an NCND to preserve the effectiveness of law enforcement and the safety of the public.

Balance Test

For the reasons set out above, GMP will neither confirm nor deny whether it holds any information on systems used by CTPNW

The public interest in maintaining the NCND position under sections 24(2) and 31(3) outweighs the public interest in confirmation or denial. This response should not be taken as an indication of whether any relevant information is held.