



Date: 24/08/2026
Our ref: 01/FOI/26/017313/J

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION REQUEST REFERENCE NO: 01/FOI/26/017313/J

I write in connection with your request for information dated 27/07/2026, received by Greater Manchester Police (GMP) for the following information:

Freedom of Information Act 2000 Request. Please accept this correspondence as a formal request for information regarding the armed policing of operations related to 'Number 10 North' and associated high-level government meetings in Greater Manchester.

- 1. ARV deployment to static duties. Please confirm if GMP Armed Response Vehicle (ARV) officers or Counter Terrorism Specialist Firearms Officers (CTSFOs) are being deployed to fulfil static armed guarding duties for these specific meetings and locations. I note that GMP does not possess dedicated Authorised Firearms Officers (AFOs) for site defence, meaning this requirement falls to ARV-trained personnel.*
- 2. Impact on active vehicle patrols. Please detail whether the deployment of ARV officers to this static operation has resulted in ARVs being taken off active patrol duties across the force area. If so, please provide the number of ARV shifts or specific vehicle patrols cancelled or abstracted to facilitate this operation between 1 July 2026 and 28 July 2026.*
- 3. Overtime expenditure. Please confirm if the armed policing requirement for this operation is being met through the payment of overtime to ARV or CTSFO personnel. If so, please provide the total cost of overtime paid to armed officers specifically for staffing this operation between 1 July 2026 and 28 July 2026.*
- 4. Operational abstraction strategy. Please provide any internal policy documents, operational orders, or briefing notes that detail how the force balances the requirement to police this static location against the need to maintain standard ARV patrol coverage across Greater Manchester.*

Result of Searches

Greater Manchester Police can neither confirm nor deny that it holds the information you requested as the duty in Section 1(1)(a) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 does not apply, by virtue of the following exemptions:

- **Section 23(5) - Information Supplied by or Relating to Bodies Dealing with Security Matters,**
- **Section 24(2) - National Security,**
- **Section 31(3) - Law Enforcement,**
- **Section 38(2) - Health and Safety.**

Sections 24, 31 and 38 are qualified exemptions. There is a requirement to articulate the harm that would be caused by confirming or denying that any information is held. Section 23 is an absolute exemption. There is no requirement to consider the public interest when considering this exemption.

Harm:

This request seeks confirmation of policing arrangements for locations associated with senior government activity. Confirming or denying which assets are deployed would reveal the existence or absence of particular security measures, the policing tactics being adopted at specific locations, potential involvement of specialist firearms resources, and the nature and scale of the perceived threat and security response.

It also seeks information capable of revealing the size and availability of firearms resources, the resilience of armed policing capability across Greater Manchester, how many officers and vehicles are required to support a particular operation and whether the operation affects routine armed response capacity.

Overtime costs directly correlate with the number of available resources. They therefore act as a proxy for operational strength and resourcing. Confirmation of whether information relating to overtime expenditure exists or not, could allow inferences to be made regarding operational armed policing arrangements.

Confirming whether any briefing documents or operational orders are in place in relation to a particular location could reveal information about protective security planning and operations.

Factors in favour of confirming or denying that any information is held:

The public are entitled to know how public funds are spent and resources distributed within an area of policing, particularly regarding how the police proactively prevent terrorist offending. To confirm or deny whether information exists would enable the public to hold GMP to account in relation to how they approach the policing of high-profile locations and how resourcing and operational decisions are made. Furthermore, confirming or denying may improve public debate and assist the community to take steps to protect themselves.

Factors in favour of neither confirming nor denying that any information is held:

Considering the current security climate within the United Kingdom, no information which may aid a terrorist should be disclosed. To what extent this information may aid a terrorist is

unknown, but it will have an impact on a force's ability to monitor terrorist activity. The public entrust the Police Service to make appropriate decisions regarding their safety and protection. The only way of reducing risk is to be cautious with what is placed into the public domain. If this information was held and disclosed, it would reveal operational policing matters relating to the protection of a high-profile location and the people within. This information could be used by terrorists to significantly affect the national infrastructure by targeting their attacks/extremist ideology.

GMP has a duty of care to the community at large and public safety is of paramount importance. If an FOI disclosure revealed information to the world (by citing an exemption or stating no information held) that would assist an offender, it would undermine the security of the national infrastructure by revealing our 'intelligence' thereby highlighting vulnerabilities of this specific location.

By its very nature, by confirming or denying this information is held would undermine the effective delivery of operational law enforcement. Under FOI there is a requirement to comply with s1(1)(a) and confirm what information is held. In some cases, it is that confirmation, or not, which could disclose facts harmful to members of the public and police officers or other law enforcement agencies.

Balance Test

The points above highlight the merits of confirming, or denying, whether information pertinent to this request exists. The security of the country is of paramount importance and the Police Service is charged with enforcing the law, preventing and detecting crime and protecting the communities we serve. As part of that policing purpose, various operations with other law enforcement bodies may or may not be ongoing. The Police Service will never divulge whether information is held if to do so would place the safety of individuals at risk or undermine National Security. Whilst there is a public interest in appropriately and effectively engaging with the threat from criminals and terrorists, there is a very strong public interest in safeguarding National Security. As much as there is a public interest in knowing that policing activity is appropriate and balanced in matters of National Security, this will only be overridden in exceptional circumstances.

The public entrust the Police Service to make appropriate decisions regarding their safety and protection and the only way of reducing risk is to be cautious with any information that is released. Confirming or denying whether information is or isn't held would reveal policing activity and would assist those who are intent on causing harm. Any incident that results from confirmation or denial would, by default, affect National Security. GMP will not divulge information if it is likely that it will compromise the work of the Police Service or place members of the public at risk. It is known that terrorists have previously targeted government buildings and senior politicians. Confirmation or denial that any relevant information is held would aid terrorists who intend on targeting this location and the government personnel within. This will adversely affect GMP's ability to detect this type of crime as it may alter the behaviours of those who are intent on committing such crimes to counteract any policing measures that may or may not be in place. This could put the life at risk along with that of National Security.

No inference can be taken from this refusal that the information requested does or does not exist.